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Cooperative bioengagement efforts, as practiced by U.S. government-funded entities, 
such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Cooperative Biological Engagement 
Program, the State Department’s Biosecurity Engagement Program, and parallel pro-
grams in other countries, exist at the nexus between public health and security. These 
programs have an explicit emphasis on developing projects that address the priorities of 
the partner country as well as the donor. While the objectives of cooperative bioengage-
ment programs focus on reducing the potential for accidental or intentional misuse and/
or release of dangerous biological agents, many partner countries are interested in bio-
engagement as a means to improve basic public health capacities. This article examines 
the extent to which cooperative bioengagement projects address public health capacity 
building under the revised International Health Regulations and alignment with the Global 
Health Security Agenda action packages.
Keywords: international health regulations, global health security agenda, biological threat reduction, 
cooperative bioengagement, health systems strengthening
inTrODUcTiOn
The concept of “cooperative threat reduction” (CTR) was introduced in the years immediately fol-
lowing the collapse of the former Soviet Union (FSU), when concerns abounded that the equipment, 
expertise, and materials used as part of state-supported nuclear programs were suddenly vulnerable 
to exploitation and misuse (1). To counter this apparent threat, Senators Nunn and Luger spear-
headed the passage of legislation to form US government programs that would engage the newly 
formed nations of the FSU in rebuilding peaceful, civilian research, and development capabilities 
while also reducing the threat that nefarious state or non-state actors would gain access to capabilities 
for producing an unconventional weapon. From the first Department of Defense programs to assist 
in safely dismantling the Soviet nuclear arsenal authorized by The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction 
Act of 1991 (commonly known as the Nunn-Lugar Act) (2), CTR programs expanded to encompass 
collaborative efforts by the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy to secure nuclear, chemical, 
and biological threats throughout the FSU. After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, the 
State Department recognized the similar need to engage Iraqi scientists who had previously been 
employed in state-run weapons programs, and thus CTR programs expanded beyond the FSU. CTR 
has become a global enterprise, with more than $1 billion in US funds annually supporting partner-
ships in countries on every continent (3, 4).
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A hallmark of modern CTR programs is the recognized 
need to develop projects that meet partner country needs and 
priorities as well as the goal of reduced threat of misuse or 
proliferation (5, 6). In the last decade, the CTR framework with 
respect to biological agents shifted from “cooperative biological 
threat reduction” to “cooperative biological engagement,” or 
bioengagement, reflecting the transition away from destruction 
of biological munitions and related manufacturing capabilities to 
an emphasis on prevention. There are also some key distinctions 
from parallel chemical and radio-nuclear programs. First, most 
high-priority biological agents occur naturally in the environ-
ment. These pathogens cause disease outbreaks that can severely 
affect public health and development, and economic stability, and 
may be difficult to distinguish from an intentional attack without 
further investigation. Cooperative bioengagement efforts to date 
have focused on prevention of acquisition from the environ-
ment, along with developing enhanced security and safety at 
laboratories, an emphasis on responsible conduct of research, 
and improved capacities to detect disease outbreaks and other 
unusual events (7, 8). These areas of focus aim at limiting the 
opportunities for accidental or intentional release of a pathogen 
as well as improving the likelihood that the US and the broader 
international community would be alerted quickly of any suspi-
cious outbreak. Because many of the biological agents deemed 
high risk for weaponization by the US and others are also high-
priority endemic or epidemic-prone diseases of public health 
significance, cooperative bioengagement can provide a mutually 
acceptable platform for forming new country partnerships, 
particularly in vulnerable or insecure regions or countries where 
a traditional “security” program might be politically sensitive or 
operationally limited.
Cooperative bioengagement allows projects to be developed 
that meet both public health and security objectives, provid-
ing incentives for partner countries who often have health and 
development concerns foremost in their national priorities. 
These priorities may even be driven by international legal obli-
gations. For example, the World Health Organization’s revised 
International Health Regulations (IHR) mandate that all 196 
States Parties develop the core capacities needed to detect, assess, 
report, and respond to events that could constitute a public health 
emergency of international concern (PHEIC). By June 2014, the 
end date of the first 2-year extension for implementation, only 
64 countries out of the 196 States Parties to the IHR declared 
that they had met these minimum core capacity requirements (9). 
Those States Parties that are not yet in compliance have until June 
2016 to develop the necessary capacities, indicating significant 
opportunity for partnership with the international community, 
provided objectives of both sides are aligned.
Recognizing the potential benefits of multi-sectoral col-
laboration with respect to controlling disease outbreaks, in 
February 2014, 29 countries, together with WHO, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Organisation 
for Animal Health (OIE) announced the launch of the Global 
Health Security Agenda (GHSA). While not binding, the GHSA 
represents a partnership of now over 40 countries committed 
to accelerating and elevating progress toward “a world safe and 
secure from infectious disease threats” (10).
In this paper, we sought to identify existing efforts on the 
complementarity between health security frameworks (11, 12), 
and explore the extent to which IHR and GHSA overlap with 
priorities for developing and executing bioengagement pro-
grams. Given cooperative bioengagement’s emphasis on country 
partnership and interest in human and animal pathogens, we 
hypothesized at least some alignment with IHR and GHSA; 
indeed, through a descriptive mapping exercise and a series of 
case studies, we demonstrate that cooperative bioengagement 
provides significant, although imperfect, alignment with these 
existing health security frameworks.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
Using open source material, we mapped cooperative bioengage-
ment priorities, based on four examples of bioengagement 
programs, against the core capacity indicators for the IHR and 
GHSA action packages. We then identified three projects, funded 
by bioengagement programs, to use as case studies to examine 
how these efforts aligned with public health capacity building 
priorities, opportunities for greater cooperative programing, and 
the potential challenges to achieving cooperative bioengagement 
aims through the lens of IHR and GHSA.
cooperative Bioengagement Priorities
Using open source material, we first sought to characterize com-
mon elements across different biological engagement programs. 
Programs were selected using the following criteria:
• Information on objectives and program mission were 
available online
• The program is driven by a security and/or non-proliferation 
mandate.
Using these criteria, we identified the following four programs 
to analyze for common themes:
• U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency Cooperative 
Biological Engagement Program (CBEP)
• U.S. Department of State Biosecurity Engagement Program 
(US BEP)
• United Kingdom Biological Engagement Program (UK BEP)
• Canadian Global Partnership Program (GPP).
As a framework for identifying common mission elements 
between these programs, we used the three “pillars” identified by 
CBEP as categories for their programmatic activities, which are 
“biosafety and biosecurity capacity building,” “disease surveil-
lance, detection, diagnosis, and control” (sometimes referred to as 
“biosurveillance”), and “cooperative biological research” (7, 13).
Mapping health security Frameworks 
against Bioengagement Pillars
The IHR (14) are a legally binding agreement on health security 
issues for all Member States of the World Health Assembly, and a 
key framework against which to map bioengagement priorities. 
In addition, given its high political profile in the health security 
community since its launch in 2014, we also selected the GHSA, 
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a framework intended to promote accelerated implementation of 
IHR, and other supporting health security frameworks for analysis.
For IHR, we mapped each of the eight core capacities, the four 
specific hazards, and Points of Entry against cooperative bioengage-
ment priorities, assessing the content of each based on the indicators 
and attributes contained within the IHR Core Capacity Monitoring 
Framework (2013) (15). For GHSA, we examined each of the 11 
action packages, and their corresponding targets and measures 
(16), to identify elements to map back to the three bioengagement 
pillars. Figure  1 demonstrates the elements of bioengagement, 
IHR, and GHSA that were used in the mapping process. We arrayed 
all of these elements in a matrix to facilitate comparison.
case studies in Bioengagement
To demonstrate how the elements of IHR and GHSA map to 
the bioengagement priorities, we examined three case studies. 
We selected these case studies to be descriptive illustrations of 
bioengagement programs, and thus was a convenience sample 
representing each of the three pillars, and with sufficient publicly 
available information to identify project focus areas and goals. We 
used open source and online material to describe the following 
bioengagement projects:
• Development of Uganda’s Biosecurity Policy and Bill
• Launch of the Republic of Kenya’s Zoonotic Disease Unit 
(ZDU)
• Iraq Science Fellowship Program (ISFP).
FigUre 1 | Visual representation of the bioengagement pillars (a); ihr core capacities (B); and global health security agenda (ghsa) action 
packages (c) included in the mapping exercise.
For each case study, stated project objectives were catego-
rized per three bioengagement pillars. The project objectives 
were also examined in terms of their alignment with IHR core 
capacities and GHSA action packages.
resUlTs
Bioengagement Priorities
The programmatic focus areas, for each of the four bioengage-
ment programs analyzed (CBEP, US BEP, UK BEP, and GPP), 
were generally well characterized by the three proposed pillars 
of “biosafety and biosecurity capacity building,” “disease sur-
veillance, detection, diagnosis, and control,” and “cooperative 
biological research.” Elements that were not well captured by 
these categories but were expressed as objectives of the four 
bioengagement programs included an emphasis on engage-
ment and programmatics in certain countries and regions 
[including explicit geographic prioritization by “threat” 
although the criteria for determining level of threat are not 
always clearly defined (17)]; a focus on adherence to global 
standards and norms, including the Biological and Toxins 
Weapons Convention (BWC) (18, 19); and interest in projects 
relating to bioethics or addressing dual-use research of con-
cern (DURC) (18). Table 1 outlines the main programmatic 
focus areas we identified for each program, categorized by 
bioengagement pillar.
TaBle 1 | Bioengagement programmatic efforts and categorization into 
“pillars” corresponding to “Biological safety and security,” “disease 
surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and reporting,” and “cooperative 
biological research.”
Program Biological 
safety and 
security
Disease 
surveillance, 
detection, 
diagnosis,  
and reporting
cooperative 
biological 
research
Other  
stated  
priorities?
US CBEP 
(13, 34)
Consolidation 
and security 
of dangerous 
pathogen 
collections
Improved 
capabilities  
to detect, 
diagnose, and 
report outbreaks
Engage scientists 
in health security 
research
 
Safety and 
security of 
biological 
facilities
Collaborative 
research to 
detect biothreats
 
US BEP 
(17, 35,  
36)
Risk 
assessment
Improved 
detection and 
control of priority 
diseases
Scientist 
engagement
Explicitly 
prioritized by 
threat
Laboratory 
security 
upgrades
Field 
epidemiology 
training
Joint scientific 
collaborations
Reinforce global 
norms (i.e., 
BWC)
Biorisk 
management 
training
Surveillance  
for priority 
diseases
Research that 
advances health 
security
Sustainability
Biosafety 
associations
Training and 
research grants
“Holistic” 
biosecurity 
(i.e., law 
enforcement)
GPP  
(19, 37)
New lab and 
facility upgrades
New lab and 
facility upgrades
Scientist 
redirection
Guidelines and 
standards
Biosafety 
associations
Diagnostic 
training
Non-proliferation 
initiatives
Biosafety/
security training
UK BEP 
(18, 38,  
39)
Safety and 
security training 
packages
Molecular 
diagnostics 
training
Redirection of 
former weapons 
scientists
BTWC 
awareness and 
implementation
Biosafety 
associations
Laboratory 
capacity  
building
Collaborative 
research
Dual use and 
bioethics 
training
Physical security 
and inventory 
US CBEP, U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Program Cooperative Biological Engagement 
Program; US BEP, U.S. Department of State Biosecurity Engagement Program; GPP, 
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development Global Partnership 
Program; UK BEP, United Kingdom Ministry of Defense Biological Engagement 
Program.
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 (1) Extensive overlap of priorities exists with respect to capac-
ity building for disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, 
and control. These capabilities are a  priority across both 
IHR and GHSA frameworks as well as a stated priority for 
all four bioengagement programs that we included in our 
analysis. However, it is important to note that most of the 
bioengagement programs qualify support for this focus area 
by noting that projects must focus on “priority” pathogens. 
Similarly, under the “Detect” action packages, GHSA meas-
ures the ability to perform surveillance and appropriate 
diagnostic tests for a limited number of priority syndromes 
and diseases, while allowing flexibility in determining those 
priorities. IHR’s emphasis is solely on events that could 
constitute a public health event of international concern, 
so while certain epidemic-prone diseases are highlighted in 
Annex 2 (14) as always requiring notification to WHO (or at 
least requiring critical evaluation of whether notification is 
necessary), the core capacities needed to identify such events 
must, by definition, be capable of detecting and reporting all 
outbreaks.
 (2) Significant overlap exists between IHR, GHSA, and bio-
engagement under the biosafety and biosecurity capacity 
building pillar, but the range of activities varies. Within the 
IHR Monitoring Framework, Core Capacities 1 (National 
legislation, policy, and financing) and eight (Laboratories) 
address separate elements of this pillar: the ability to develop 
and implement legislation or regulations and laboratory 
biosafety and biosecurity, respectively. This latter indica-
tor also includes policies or regulations required above 
the institutional level. However, IHR does not emphasize 
the importance of inventory and physical security of 
pathogens, readily provide a forum for engaging biosafety 
associations, nor explicitly cover non-diagnostic/clinical 
settings. GHSA’s Prevent 3 action package (biosafety and 
biosecurity) is more comprehensive, covering all facilities 
handling especially dangerous pathogens and including 
pathogen security as a key part of the target (but not a 
measure of implementation success). While implied, 
Prevent 3 lacks an explicit mention of using a risk assess-
ment-driven approach to biosafety and biosecurity, which 
is mentioned as a  priority under several bioengagement 
programs. Under Respond 2 (Linking Public Health with 
Law Enforcement), GHSA touches on concepts related to 
“holistic” biosecurity stated in US BEP’s program priorities 
(17) though the bioengagement emphasis is on creating 
public health and law enforcement linkages to prevent an 
attack, whereas GHSA is more focused on the response 
element.
 (3) Cooperative biological research is a pillar that does not 
present any clear alignment with the IHR core capacity 
indicators nor the GHSA action package targets and 
measures. As such, our analysis indicated that as defined 
by most programs, cooperative biological research would 
not provide a means for partner countries to achieve 
any aspects of IHR or GHSA compliance. This does not 
preclude activities that do further IHR and GHSA aims 
from simultaneously engaging biological scientists in 
Bioengagement Priorities and alignment 
with ihr and ghsa
Figure 2 illustrates the alignment of IHR core capacity attributes 
and GHSA action package targets, organized against the pillars of 
bioengagement. Through this exercise, we came away with three 
major findings:
FigUre 2 | ihr core capacities and ghsa action packages mapped against the three pillars of bioengagement programs. Note that there is no overlap 
of IHR and GHSA core capacities and action packages with the “cooperative biological research” pillar of bioengagement.
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a similar fashion to that achieved by designated coop-
erative biological research projects; however, the form 
of the engagement and the way the project is developed 
are likely to be significantly different from a traditional 
research project, where the emphasis is on hypothesis-
driven investigation, rather than relationship building, 
training, or applicability to public health.
cooperative Bioengagement in action: 
case studies
In order to further explore the extent of overlap between bioen-
gagement priorities and the IHR/GHSA frameworks, we selected 
three case studies, each representing one of the three main pillars 
of bioengagement. Through this process, we were able to confirm 
some of the observations from the a  priori mapping exercise, 
while also identify other observations related to the opportuni-
ties and challenges of aligning bioengagement programs with 
implementation of health security frameworks.
Uganda Biosecurity Policy and Bill
In 2012, the Uganda National Council for Science & Technology 
(UNCST), in collaboration with Global Implementation 
Solutions (GIS) and with funding support from the US BEP, held 
a consultative workshop to discuss the development of a new 
national biosecurity policy (20, 21). The intention was to create a 
biosecurity policy that would build on and complement Uganda’s 
existing 2008 biotechnology and biosafety policy, and specifically 
address biosecurity issues as well as Uganda’s obligations under 
the BWC. Since the initial kick-off meeting, there have been a 
number of additional consultations and sensitization efforts, 
involving broad representation from Ugandan government min-
istries as well as a variety of other stakeholders. A Bill, written 
based on the policy, will be submitted to the Ugandan Parliament 
by the end of 2015 (21).
Based on stated objectives from UNCST, the Bill will cover 
seven main objectives (Table 2). These outcomes span prepared-
ness, early detection of disease threats, and integrated response 
to emerging events as well as a recognition of the importance 
of collaborations an partnerships; these, thus, reach beyond 
“pure” biosecurity concerns, and touch on aspects of both other 
pillars of bioengagement. It is, therefore, worth highlighting the 
distinction between the deliverable of the funded project, which 
is the development of the Policy and the Bill and its submission 
to Parliament, versus the projected impact of implementation of 
the Bill once passed into law. Figure 3 examines the sequential 
impact of the development of the Policy and Bill (solid boxes) 
versus those areas that will also be addressed once the Bill is 
implemented (transparent boxes).
Overall, the focus of the Policy and Bill development project 
align very closely with GHSA Prevent 3, with respect to creating 
a national framework for biosafety and biosecurity (Figure  3). 
There is less alignment with IHR; however, actual implementa-
tion of the Policy and Bill will address IHR core capacities, such 
as Core Capacity 1 (National legislation, policy, and financing) 
and Core Capacity 8 (Laboratories) and therefore Policy and Bill 
development can be seen to be acting in support of IHR.
Kenya Zoonotic Disease Unit
The Kenya ZDU was launched in August 2012 as a joint initia-
tive between the then Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation 
TaBle 2 | characterization of Uganda Biosecurity Policy stated 
outcomes within the defined pillars of bioengagement programs.
Uganda Biosecurity Policy  
stated outcomes (20)
Bioengagement 
pillar
Ensure emergency preparedness, at the field, 
community, and health facility levels
Disease surveillance, 
detection, diagnosis, 
and control
Facilitate early detection of and response to emerging 
disease threats
Disease surveillance, 
detection, diagnosis, 
and control
Ensure integrated response to threats and 
rationalization of controls
N/A
Put in place the containment principles, technologies, 
and practices that are implemented, to prevent the 
unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins, or 
their accidental or intentional release
Biosafety and 
biosecurity capacity 
building
Reduce the risk of biothreats by guiding the 
development of safety and security standards that 
are consistent with international guidelines and 
requirements
Biosafety and 
biosecurity capacity 
building
Create opportunities for capacity building to generate a 
critical mass of scientific and technological expertise in 
biorisk management
Biosafety and 
biosecurity capacity 
building
Promote collaborations, partnerships, and linkages at 
national, regional, and international levels to provide 
inclusive, effective, affordable, and practical solutions 
to pressing local and international concerns
Cooperative 
biological research
FigUre 3 | Uganda Biosecurity Policy and Bill case study. Solid boxes indicate elements supported directly by the development of the Policy and Bill; 
transparent boxes indicate additional elements which would be addressed through implementation of the Bill (and after approval by the Ugandan Parliament).
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including construction of the building housing the unit and the 
development of the strategic plan, were provided by CBEP and 
the US BEP (23), with technical assistance from GIS, a US BEP 
grantee (24). Both programs continue to support ZDU activities, 
including the drafting of guidelines for priority zoonotic diseases 
and a regional One Health conference hosted by the ZDU (24, 25).
The goals for the ZDU, as described in the 2012–2017 Strategic 
Plan, can be summarized as improving surveillance and control 
of zoonotic diseases; establishing partnerships related to One 
Health; and conducting research on zoonotic pathogens (Table 3). 
These align closely with the disease surveillance and cooperative 
research pillars of bioengagement.
In terms of alignment with IHR and GHSA objectives, the 
main overlaps are with core capacities/action packages associated 
with surveillance, reporting, and zoonotic diseases (Figure 4). It 
is also worth noting that the targets and measures outlined for 
surveillance (Detect 2/3) under GHSA do not specifically cover 
zoonotic diseases; suggested syndromes are provided within the 
text of the action package, but the choice should be based on coun-
try priorities, therefore providing an opportunity to include prior-
ity zoonotic syndromes. As seen earlier, the cooperative biological 
research elements of the ZDU goals do not directly correspond 
to any IHR core capacity indicator or GHSA action package.
Iraq Science Fellowship Program
The ISFP was founded in 2008 as a mechanism for creating 
opportunities for Iraqi scientists to further their careers and cre-
ate new collaborative opportunities by spending 3–6 months at a 
U.S. institution while conducting a specific research project. US 
CTR programs and the UK BEP have both supported biological 
[now the Ministry of Health (MoH)] and the then Ministry 
of Livestock Development [now the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock, and Fisheries (MALF)] (22). Support for the effort, 
TaBle 3 | characterization of the goals of the republic of Kenya 
Zoonotic Disease Unit (per the 2012–2017 strategic Plan) within the 
defined pillars of bioengagement programs.
Kenya Zoonotic Disease  
Unit goals (2012–2017)
Bioengagement 
pillar
To strengthen surveillance, prevention, and control of 
zoonoses in both humans and animals
Disease surveillance, 
detection, diagnosis, 
and control
To establish structures and partnerships that promotes 
One Health approaches
Disease surveillance, 
detection, diagnosis, 
and control
To conduct applied research at the human–animal–
ecosystem interface in order to better understand 
the mechanism of maintenance and transmission of 
zoonotic pathogens
Cooperative biological 
research
FigUre 4 | republic of Kenya Zoonotic Disease Unit case study.
TaBle 4 | characterization of the goals and expected outcomes of 
the iraq science Fellowship Program within the defined pillars of 
bioengagement programs.
iraq science Fellowship Program  
goals and outcomes (26, 40)
Bioengagement pillar
Enrich their scientific knowledge Cooperative biological research
Develop valuable skills to promote Iraq’s  
scientific community
Cooperative biological research
Learn new methods and expertise to  
improve research capabilities
Cooperative biological research
Opportunity to increase Iraq’s scientific  
capacity
Cooperative biological research
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ISFP fellows in past years (26), and in 2014, CBEP also launched 
a biologist-specific fellowship program [known as the Iraq 
Biosciences Fellowship Program (IBFP)] supporting scientists 
from the Iraq MoH, Ministry of Agriculture, and Ministry of 
Science and Technology (26).
The stated objectives of ISFP and IBFP relate entirely to 
creating research networks, building scientific capacity, and pro-
viding the fellows with skills to advance their research careers, 
all of which fall under bioengagement’s cooperative biological 
research pillar, and particularly the focus areas related to scientist 
engagement (Table 4). However, an examination of the scientific 
disciplines given selection preference by IBFP (27) indicate that 
beyond these stated objectives, there may in fact be significant 
additional overlap with bioengagement priorities. For example, 
a scientist selected to work on biosecurity policy issues at a US 
institution would not only constitute cooperative research but 
also biosecurity capacity building; likewise a fellow working on 
novel viral diagnostic methods would also be addressing biosur-
veillance objectives while part of the collaborative research effort.
Taken at face value, given that neither IHR nor GHSA 
explicitly contain indicators or measures related to coop-
erative research or scientist engagement, there is little if 
any overlap between ISFP/IBFP and these health security 
frameworks (Figure 5). However, the specific research projects 
conducted by the researchers participating in the fellowship 
programs may themselves relate back to biosafety, biosecurity, 
or disease surveillance efforts, which in turn could have bearing 
on IHR or GHSA implementation. To our knowledge, lists of 
ISFP and IBFP fellowship projects are not published online or 
available through open sources, so we were unable to determine 
if additional areas of alignment exist between ISFP/IBFP and 
IHR or GHSA at the research project level.
DiscUssiOn
This work describes the alignment of cooperative bioengagement 
programmatic elements with IHR core capacities and GHSA 
action packages, as described through mapping of program pri-
orities and qualitative examination of three case studies. Overall, 
IHR and GHSA represent opportunities to bioengagement pro-
grams that may be seeking leverage points around which to form 
new partnerships, and also to the implementation community, 
who may be able to better tailor projects and receive funding from 
bioengagement programs to support existing health security 
activities that advance IHR and GHSA compliance. These areas, 
notably aspects of biosafety and biosecurity capacity building 
and biosurveillance, could also provide an opportunity for 
FigUre 5 | iraq science Fellowship Program and iraq Biosciences Fellowship Program case study. Note that without greater detail on the research 
projects supported through these fellowships, it is difficult to determine the elements of IHR or GHSA that might be advanced through the projects; IHR and GHSA 
otherwise do not contain elements that align directly with collaborative research aims or scientist engagement.
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bioengagement programs to develop evaluation measures and 
metrics that meet partner country targets with respect to IHR 
and GHSA.
However, we also observed clear gaps in the extent of over-
lap between some areas of bioengagement efforts and IHR/
GHSA  priorities. Within the biosecurity pillar in particular, 
there remain differences related to definitions of key terms, ideal 
outcomes, and the precedence placed on national-level legislative 
and regulatory frameworks as a mechanism to achieve sustain-
able implementation. For example, while IHR’s biosafety and 
biosecurity-related attributes are focused primarily at the level of 
diagnostic laboratories, the emphasis of GHSA’s Prevent 3 action 
package is on the development of national-level regulatory or 
legislative frameworks, thus targeting a different level of decision-
makers and stakeholders; the Uganda Biosecurity Policy and Bill 
project, which we selected as our biosecurity case study, fit more 
closely with this latter definition. Similarly, within the veterinary 
sector, “biosecurity” usually does not refer to preventing unau-
thorized access to pathogens, but rather corresponds to the suite 
of control measures applied to protect against and prevent the 
spread of disease (28). In addition, words, such as “security” and 
“biosecurity,” may be associated with cultural and social sensitivi-
ties, which may differ significantly between partner countries and 
regions, and thus need to be taken into account when describing 
project outcomes and establishing new partnerships. The Kenya 
ZDU case study highlighted that although bioengagement pro-
grams have a strong interest in zoonotic diseases, it may prove 
more challenging to link zoonotic disease-focused bioengage-
ment projects with IHR or GHSA-driven targets and measures.
The cooperative biological engagement pillar did not have 
clear areas of alignment with any of the IHR core capacities 
or GHSA action packages. There is no mention of networking 
between researchers or scientists, or the basic research and 
development underpinnings of health security in IHR or GHSA. 
However, when examining the case studies, it was clear that pro-
jects funded under different pillars that explicitly address IHR 
and GHSA objectives can also have a clearly defined research 
component; likewise, “pure” cooperative research projects, if 
focused on subject areas that related to disease surveillance, 
control, or biorisk management, may also result in improved 
IHR or GHSA compliance in the long-term. One solution to 
this apparent paradox could be to reconsider the three pillars of 
bioengagement, and rather than consider cooperative research as 
an end in itself, recognize it as a means for advancing sustainable 
capacity building for biosafety/biosecurity and biosurveillance 
activities. Another option could be to categorize programmatic 
efforts based on the target audience: i.e., national-level ini-
tiatives, facility-level initiatives, and science/knowledge-based 
initiatives. There is precedence for both such approaches (7, 
8), and so future academic analyses of the overlaps between 
bioengagement and other frameworks may want to examine the 
impact of these alternative characterizations. Such an approach 
might also address the observation from the Uganda Biosecurity 
Bill case study that there can be a distinction between the direct 
outcomes of the funded project (in this case, a Policy and piece of 
legislation) and future projected impacts (implementation of the 
legislation). Adapting the way projects are characterized within 
bioengagement programs might provide a more explicit means 
for acknowledging the broad benefits that can sometimes accrue 
from even narrowly focused projects.
The case studies revealed several other points for further 
consideration. When researching case studies, we found little 
information on specific bioengagement-funded projects in the 
public domain, let alone on project outcomes, which signifi-
cantly limited the extent to which we could analyze alignment 
with IHR/GHSA. To our knowledge, there are no universally 
accepted metrics consistently used across bioengagement pro-
grams; those that have been developed for specific programs, 
such as RAND’s effort related to DTRA’s CBEP (7), have not 
been used publicly to evaluate project success, but rather may 
be kept for internal use within the program. While it is pos-
sible to conduct convincing meta-analyses without shared 
metrics, the lack of outcome-focused data in the public domain 
at all related to these programs limits opportunities for such 
analysis. Implementers can moreover have legal restrictions on 
the extent to which they can publish project-related informa-
tion (for example they may be constrained by Non-Disclosure 
Agreements), or may feel obliged not to publicize project details 
if they feel it could jeopardize future funding. Moreover, some 
implementers, particularly those with a public health mandate, 
may not be comfortable advertising their funding as coming 
from a bioengagement source due to the security connotations. 
Overall, these factors make it very challenging for independent, 
objective analysis of bioengagement programs and the extent to 
which they are successful at promoting compliance with health 
security frameworks.
FigUre 6 | schematic demonstration of the spectrum of disease 
control, incorporating the steps of “Prevent,” “Detect,” “assess,” 
“report,” and “respond,” and highlighting the areas of each 
encapsulated by bioengagement, ihr, and ghsa priorities and 
efforts.
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A final observation, which was largely beyond the scope of 
this paper but should be examined in more detail in further 
analytical efforts, was to note the aspects of IHR and GHSA that 
might be overlooked if bioengagement programs were the only 
groups working in a particular country or region. Thinking across 
the spectrum of disease control, it is notable that bioengagement 
programs focus primarily on prevention, detection, assessment, 
and reporting of disease events, rather than response; IHR and 
GHSA, in contrast, place a high priority on response capabilities, 
through core capacity 4 (Response) and action package Respond 
1–3, respectively (Figure  6). While bioengagement programs 
have made significant investments in building emergency opera-
tions capacities in several countries [examples include Jordan 
(29), Vietnam (30), and Uganda (31)], these have been framed 
exclusively as “preparedness” efforts, and particularly among the 
US-funded bioengagement programs, funding is generally not 
available to support activities that are solely response-oriented, 
given their non-proliferation and prevention mandate (32). This 
suggests that countries seeking to form partnerships to develop 
their capacities to respond to disease threats may need to look 
outside the bioengagement donor community, or describe their 
needs carefully to emphasize the preparedness elements.
This descriptive exercise provided an opportunity to acknowl-
edge the diversity of programmatic efforts throughout different 
international bioengagement programs, and also recognize the 
potential for greater alignment with parallel efforts that exist 
solely in the global health sphere, including those which have 
yet to become significant stakeholders in the on-going health 
security dialog. Major players in global health, for example, 
“traditional” vertical disease control programs, such as the 
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and even 
non-communicable disease control efforts, are realizing their role 
in meeting some aspects of IHR implementation, for example 
in building laboratory capacity (33). Some of these efforts may 
moreover directly align with bioengagement priorities, even if 
the motivation behind the project differs. The opportunity to re-
examine the donor landscape with respect to the full spectrum 
of disease and biological threats may, thus, provide opportunities 
for greater coordination between sectors. This, in turn, could have 
a positive impact not only on project outcomes, but also for in-
country perceptions of bioengagement programs, leading in turn 
to deeper, more sustainable relationships with partner countries.
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